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INTERVIEW 
WITH PHILIPPE DESCOLA
Professor Philippe Descola visited Finland 
in October 2015 to deliver the Edward 
Westermarck Memorial Lecture during 
the biennial conference of the Finnish 
Anthropological Society, which had the theme, 
‘Landscapes, sociality, and materiality’. During 
a career spanning four decades, Professor 
Descola, who currently holds the Chair in the 
Anthropology of Nature at the Collège de 
France, has built on his ethnographic research 
with the Achuar of the Upper Amazon to make 
many groundbreaking contributions in the 
research fields of ecological anthropology, the 
ethnography of lowland South America, and 
the comparative study of human-nonhuman 
relations. Perhaps his most widely known 
contribution has been the development of 
a framework that displaces the assumed 
universality of the Western nature/culture 
dichotomy by providing models of four possible 
ontological modes of structural relations 
through which humans and nonhumans 
form viable collectives. His current research 
project takes the form of a book showing how 
the differences between the four ontological 
modes are made evident in the investigation of 
processes of iconic figuration.
In connection with the conference and 
his Westermarck lecture entitled ‘Landscape 
as Transfiguration’, Professor Descola granted 
the following interview, discussing some of the 
main interests and themes that have informed 
his research career.
Aleksis Toro (AT): Your early studies were 
in philosophy but you decided to pursue 
anthropology and did fieldwork for three years 
in the mid-1970s with the Achuar of the Upper 
Amazon, investigating how they related to 
nature in their surroundings. What sparked 
your interest in anthropology and compelled 
you to embark on that project?
Philippe Descola (PD): Well there’s a long 
tradition in France of social scientists converting 
from philosophy to the social sciences. It started 
early on with Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Lévi-
Strauss, and a long list of other names, and 
more recently Bourdieu, Godelier and other 
people went through this metamorphosis. And 
one has to take into account that this is a certain 
variety of philosophy, not French philosophy 
in itself but a way of teaching philosophy in 
France, which is based on the critical history of 
discursive formations. It is a very good training 
to allow you to understand how concepts are 
in interplay with other concepts in specific 
texts, how texts from one philosopher respond 
to texts from another philosopher, etc. But I 
felt dissatisfied by the fact that the questions 
that were being asked were the questions that 
had been asked ever since 2500 years ago—
from the Greeks onwards—about being, about 
truth, about the legitimacy of certain kinds 
of scientific propositions, about morality etc., 
without taking into account other ways of 
asking these questions that had been observed 
by anthropologists and by historians. So there 
was a self-centered dimension to philosophy 
which I found problematic, and this is why 
rather than being interested in experiments 
of thought, again like many others in France, 
I preferred to study or to be acquainted with real 
life experiments—how people live and the way 
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they organize their lives: questions that were 
not conceivable in the philosophical panorama 
in general. 
I had been interested in anthropology in 
general very early on. I’d read Tristes Tropiques 
when I was 16 or 17 and I was fascinated, not 
so much by the Indians in the book because 
it’s an intellectual biography, but by the man, 
Lévi-Strauss, someone who was at the same 
time obviously a very learned and sensible 
person, who wrote very well, with a very incisive 
mind, who could write as well on Debussy and 
Rousseau and on the Bororo Indians in Brazil. 
So this form of humanism, of very broad culture, 
fascinated me... and I said, ‘If this person is an 
anthropologist, then anthropology must also 
be a fascinating science.’ This is how I decided 
to read a little bit more in anthropology. I 
went through the classical French system of 
competitive examination and to the École 
normale supérieure, where all my co-disciples 
were either in literature or philosophy, even math 
or physics, because it’s an integrative school, and 
they were discussing the more philosophical 
texts of Lévi-Strauss and anthropology like The 
Savage Mind and Tristes Tropiques. I was also 
interested in The Elementary Structures of Kinship 
and things like that which were more technical, 
so progressively I moved towards anthropology. 
And then there was a former student of the 
École normale supérieure, Maurice Godelier, 
who was young at the time and just back from 
his fieldwork with the Baruya in New Guinea. 
He had just published a book which was called 
Rationality and Irrationality in Economics, which 
was broadly speaking a criticism of political 
economy and a new reading of Marx’s Capital, 
which was a very common thing at the time, 
as we were immersed in the texts of Marx and 
Engels, especially Marx. And so at the end of 
his book there is an analysis of pre-capitalist 
forms of production and exchange which I 
found fascinating. Here was a rigorous way to 
enter the question of the diversity of forms of 
life in the world. So that’s when I decided to 
become an anthropologist.
I went to southern Mexico for my first 
fieldwork. I was, as were many of the students 
in philosophy in my generation, a militant, I 
was a Trotskyite, so I thought that by going 
into the cauldron of neo-colonialism to try 
to understand the local situation, I would be 
faithful to my political leanings. So I went 
to southern Chiapas, to a place in the forest 
where Tzeltal colonists, that is, Maya Indians 
from the highlands, had moved to settle the 
forest because they had been pushed away from 
their lands by landowners. And I was already 
interested in the way that people adapt to new 
environmental circumstances. The problem was 
they did not adapt very well, in the sense that 
they felt rather unhappy. It was a very different 
form of environment; although it was only a six 
or seven days walk from the highlands, it was 
really deep forest. So I spent a few months there 
and then I felt dispirited because they were 
themselves quite unhappy, and I said, ‘I can’t 
spend two years with people who are not really 
happy in the forest.’ I think it’s important that 
when you do fieldwork you should at least feel 
well. Otherwise, if fieldwork is a sort of duty, I 
don’t think it is good fieldwork. You can’t do 
good fieldwork if every morning you say ‘I must 
get up and do my work.’ You must enter into the 
flow of things in order to do good fieldwork. So 
in that case it didn’t go well, and in fact these 
people became the forerunners of the Zapatista 
movement, so there were good reasons not to 
be happy, the landowners were also moving into 
the forest, etc.
I had thought about going to Amazonia 
but I thought it was very petty bourgeois, you 
know, romantic and so on, but I decided to 
hell with my scruples, so I decided to go to 
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Amazonia for a variety of reasons. One of them 
was that we had no real understanding of what 
Amazonia was and what Amazonian people 
were. Of course there was Lévi-Strauss and a few 
good ethnographers—there were Stephen and 
Christine Hugh-Jones who had just come back 
from the field, we’re talking about the beginning 
of the 1970s. I went to Mexico in 1973 and I 
went to the Amazon in 1974, to Ecuador. At 
the time there were only a very few things: some 
of the things that Lévi-Strauss had written on 
mythology, there were people like Maybury-
Lewis who had written on the Xavante—a very 
classical monograph of the British sociological 
school—and there was Goldman on the 
Cubeo… There were a few books but there was 
no tradition in anthropology on the lowlands. 
One of the things which struck me when 
reading this scattered ethnographic literature—
which in fact began, by contrast with other parts 
of the world, very early on in the 16th century, 
before ethnography or anthropology became 
real sciences—was a sort of leitmotif in this 
ethnography or in these first descriptions, which 
continues today, which is that these people are 
mysterious and enigmatic, in the sense that they 
don’t show any kind of institution that could be 
likened to the institutions we are used to. The 
French chroniclers who visited and some who 
settled on the coast of Brazil in the 16th century 
wrote that these people were sans foi, sans roi, sans 
loi—‘without faith, king, or law’— so they did 
not exhibit any of the normal institutions. There 
was no territory to speak of—at least there were 
no villages, in many cases people were living in 
scattered habitats—there were no chiefs, there 
were no cults, few rituals, and the rituals were 
all linked to war. Europeans were very puzzled 
by this, and what they all emphasized was that 
these people were ‘naturals’, they were in fact 
in a way glued to nature—either positively, in 
Montaigne’s sense as naked philosophers, or as 
groups intent on killing each other, incapable 
of controlling their natural instincts. So there 
was a leitmotif there. I was reading these 
chronicles and then the proto-ethnography and 
the later ethnography, and I was struck by this 
and thought there must be something in their 
relation to nature which is very specific for this 
leitmotif to go on for centuries. And at the time 
the main type of publication in anthropology 
on Amazonia in the United States belonged 
to the so-called cultural ecology school, which 
was extremely reductionist and also interpreted 
all social and cultural features as products of 
adaptation to nature, so there was a continuity 
in that sense. So I left for fieldwork with the 
idea of precisely studying in depth how these 
people related to what I still called at the time 
‘nature’. So that’s how I went to Ecuador with 
my wife Anne-Christine Taylor.
AT: You’ve said that your central anthropo-
logical interests derive from the astonishment 
you felt when you encountered some Achuar 
ways of doing things. Why is astonishment 
important for ethnography, and how do the 
encounters and stories of your time with the 
Achuar continue to inform your work?
PD: I think astonishment is absolutely 
crucial. Ever since Plato it’s considered to 
be an important quality for philosophers 
never to take anything for granted and to 
be astonished by things, and I think it is also 
true for anthropologists. This is why going to 
places which are, and to live among people 
who are, very different from the ones you’ve 
been brought up with, is not a question of 
primitivism or essentialism or whatever name 
you want to give to that. It’s a question of 
using the distance as a lever to pry open the 
concepts that would otherwise appear matter 
of fact or self-evident. The epistemological 
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distance is always created of course, but if 
there is effectively a cultural distance, it helps 
destabilize one’s own assumptions. And this is 
why Amazonia was very interesting, because it 
was perhaps the farthest one could go in terms 
of differences. There was a sort of logical scandal 
in these people: where was society there? 
Especially among the Achuar: again, living 
in a very scattered habitat, feuding between 
themselves, having no chief... I had heard before 
a very interesting description by a Dominican 
missionary who had been living near the Achuar 
at the end of the 19th century, who said they had 
no religion except birdsongs and dreams. And 
that was very clever to understand because 
dreams are one of the means of communication 
with nonhumans, the spiritual dimension of 
nonhumans, and birdsongs are songs that the 
Achuar and the Jivaro in general sing constantly 
in order to connect themselves with them. So he 
had a clear idea of what their religion was, but 
this lucidity was not very common at the time. 
So this is why the Achuar were fascinating.
AT: Is there a particular encounter or story 
that was very memorable?
PD: I mentioned a specific episode in Beyond 
Nature and Culture, at the beginning of the 
book. In this story we are in a house and the 
lady of the house goes to dump the garbage by 
the river and she’s bitten by a snake. It’s a very 
dangerous snake so she’s terrified, and everyone 
in the house begins wailing, ‘She’s going to die, 
she’s going to die!’ I had serum so I gave her 
an injection but the husband was completely 
devastated. I tried to speak with him to lift up 
his spirits, but he said, ‘It’s my fault, it’s my fault 
because it was the revenge of the Master of the 
Animals. Yesterday I went to the forest; I had 
a new shotgun…’ He used to hunt before with 
his blowgun only and he had acquired a shotgun. 
There was a troop of woolly monkeys and he 
killed many more than he needed to kill. It’s a 
very classical story among hunters everywhere 
in the world: his hubris made him responsible 
for the revenge that took the form of a snake 
bite on his wife. And talking to him I realized 
how important it was. 
You know when you do fieldwork it takes 
a long time to learn the language—it took us 
about a year, and so progressively you understand 
bits and pieces. There was only one young man 
who knew a little Spanish. The first place where 
we landed people accepted us quite willingly, 
I suspect because we were a distraction. We were 
like pets. They have pet animals everywhere in 
their houses so we added to their collection of 
pets. They were observing us, my wife and I, and 
it was a day to day distraction, so I suspect this 
was one of the reasons they received us, and 
after a while we just became part of the daily 
life. And so learning the language progressively 
is like watching a movie in a language you don’t 
understand and then you have subtitles that 
begin to appear, but they are disconnected so 
you get bits and pieces. When you really start 
understanding things, this is precisely when you 
realize these dimensions. So during the first few 
months I did a very thorough study of the way 
they were using plants and animals, which could 
be defined as economic anthropology or human 
ecology. I collected plants and specimens of soil, 
etc. I wasn’t idle in that sense. And progressively 
I came out of this gathering of technical and 
quantifiable material to understanding what 
people were saying about the things I had 
been measuring. And obviously there was a 
huge void between what I was considering at 
the time, which was the way these people were 
adapting to their environment, and the way they 
thought about it, which was in fact as a series 
of interactions with nonhumans treated as 
social partners. So that’s when I came to realize 
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that it was absurd to think in terms of a society 
adapting to a natural environment. ‘Nature’ and 
‘society’ were useless concepts for that.
AT: In your first monograph entitled In the 
Society of Nature you sought to bridge the gap 
between ecological and symbolic approaches 
in anthropology and to demonstrate how the 
material and cultural processes that shape 
Achuar interactions with nonhumans are 
deeply interwoven. Could you say more about 
how your approach was informed by the work 
of Marx and your mentor Lévi-Strauss?
PD: There were three important threads that 
many anthropologists at the time were trying to 
weave together. One was Marxism, which was 
very important for us, the other was structuralism 
and the third was phenomenology. As students 
in philosophy we had read a lot of Husserl, and 
of course Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. And 
so the question was: how do you combine or 
weave together these obviously incompatible 
traditions? And so Godelier, for instance, was 
an interesting case of trying to produce a 
structural Marxism. Everything I did, I did 
because I felt dissatisfied, on the one the hand, 
with a materialist perspective where there would 
be a material basis and then a series of layers, 
like a layer cake—the political system and the 
ideological system, etc. Then you spend your life 
trying to understand how these different layers 
communicate and of course you can’t because 
you’ve started by dividing, disconnecting them. 
The other dimension, which was not necessarily 
that of Lévi-Strauss but of some of his students, 
was treating nature as a purely intellectual 
problem, the study of folk classifications, for 
instance, which Lévi-Strauss does very well in 
The Savage Mind. So nature is a sort of catalogue 
of properties which the mind uses in order to 
construct interesting and complex combinations 
in myth and classification, etc. But there was 
more of course than this, in the sense that the 
Achuar were not concerned only with nature as 
an intellectual problem, they were concerned 
with nature, with nonhumans, on a day to day 
basis. So they were social partners: nature was 
not only good to think, it was good to interact 
with. That was the thing that became absolutely 
obvious for me, that it was good to interact with. 
So how do you interact with nonhumans? You 
can’t interact with nature, it’s a hypostasis; it’s 
like interacting with the state. You can’t interact 
with the state; you interact with a representative 
of the state or a representative of nature. So it’s 
best to eliminate nature altogether and to see 
how people interact with nonhumans.
And in fact I did that after my doctoral 
dissertation, which was published in English 
under the title In the Society of Nature. I started 
teaching at the École des hautes études—I was 
fortunate enough to get a position soon after 
I finished my doctoral thesis—and I started a 
seminar. I was ravenous to understand, with 
ethnography from neighboring societies—that 
is from Amazonia and then progressively with 
ethnography from other parts of the world— 
…how people interacted with nonhumans 
elsewhere. So I discovered that in Amazonia 
most of the features I’d described among 
the Achuar were present. There was a very 
common ground there. The game animals 
were all considered as affines, and affinity is a 
good relationship to qualify this. This is when 
I began to read Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, 
who took affinity from the point of view of the 
relationship with humans, while I was interested 
in affinity as the relationship with nonhumans, 
and we discovered that there was a continuity. 
We arrived at affinity from different perspectives 
and interests: he came to affinity by studying 
cannibalism in general and Tupian attitudes 
towards affinity and in-laws, etc., while I came 
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to it by studying the relationship with game 
animals, and we discovered that it was the same 
realm of social relations, in general.
So during this process the seminar was 
very good because it was a research seminar, and 
I was systematically discussing these materials 
with the students, first from Amazonia and then 
from northern North America. I progressed 
northward and then westward to Siberia and 
I discovered that also in Siberia, the main 
relationship with the game animals was a 
relationship of affinity—although it wasn’t 
presented exactly like that, rather they are 
potential spouses, etc.—and that is one of the 
ideas of animism. There is something there which 
is not linked to hunting and gathering because 
they are not hunter gatherers. In Amazonia the 
main cultigens have been domesticated at least 
8,000 years ago, so it’s rather a specific outlook 
towards nonhumans that you find in different 
places in the world. And this is when I decided 
to revise this old concept of animism, which had 
fallen into disrepute, to define the fact of treating 
nonhumans through using the same categories 
that were used to treat humans. Because, of 
course, what I’d found with the Achuar as 
well was not only that the game animals were 
considered and treated as affines, but very often, 
especially among the Achuar, cultivated plants 
were treated as consanguines. So the two main 
categories with which, in Dravidian kinship 
systems, people are organized—which are 
consanguines and affines—were used also to 
deal with nonhumans. 
It was my first theory of animism, refined 
afterwards with a lot of discussions over the 
years with colleagues I like to call sparring 
partners—Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Tim 
Ingold, Bruno Latour—who are both friends 
and sparring partners in the sense that we can 
discuss freely. We agree to disagree; we have a 
good enough basis of agreement in order to be 
able to disagree. This is when I realized that my 
definition of animism was a bit too Durkheimian 
because I had contrasted it with totemism in the 
Lévi-Straussian sense, that is, totemism as the 
use of natural categories to conceptualize social 
categories, transposing differences between 
species to differences between human groups. 
I’d used this definition of totemism to contrast 
with animism, in the sense that animism was 
almost the reverse, using social categories in 
order to deal with nonhumans. Then I realized 
that that was a bit Durkheimian, and we had 
a lot of discussions with Viveiros de Castro 
in this respect and with Tim Ingold, who said 
that the Lévi-Straussian definition of totemism 
was much too classificatory and intellectual. 
So I started also reading material on Australia, 
and I became aware that it was much too 
classificatory. This is how, after a while and 
some years, I came to the combinatorial matrix 
that I put forth in Beyond Nature and Culture, 
where in fact the relationship between what I 
call animism, totemism, naturalism—which is 
‘our’ way of doing things since the 17th century, 
if you wish to give a specific date – and what I 
call analogism were all transformations of each 
other, as a transformation of an initial contrast 
between, on the one hand, interiority and 
physicality and, on the other, between difference 
and resemblance. This provided a sort of 
initial matrix to differentiate ways of detecting 
continuities and discontinuities among humans 
and nonhumans.
AT: In Beyond Nature and Culture you present 
this combinatorial matrix of models for 
possible relationships with nonhumans by 
considering a vast amount of ethnography 
from around the world. How did you intend 
the book to be taken up by anthropologists, for 
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instance in political ecology, and how would 
you sum up its central message for a wider 
audience?
PD: When you write a book like that, although 
I had these sparring partners, one of them being 
of course my wife Anne-Christine Taylor, you 
pursue a solitary path. I had no idea at all what 
would be the reception of the book, so I was 
very surprised when I saw that it triggered a lot 
of interest in many quarters. It’s been translated 
only recently into English but in French it was 
published more than ten years ago, which is a 
long enough period to see the results. And it has 
had an important effect among philosophers, 
architects, artists, geographers… a number of 
people. Not necessarily for what I intended to do, 
for a variety of reasons, with each reader taking 
from it something which he found interesting or 
relevant to the discussion in his own discipline. 
So I’m entirely convinced of the idea that once 
you write a book it escapes you entirely, as it is 
being read and commented on, interpreted by 
other people. I think it was Valéry who said that 
it may even be that the interpretation that the 
reader gives may be more interesting than the 
one you give of your own writing. So you do 
not own a copyright on your ideas. They are just 
scattered in the wide world and it’s absurd to 
maintain any orthodoxy. People use it and I’m 
observing with interest what people are doing 
with it.
I did this book because I was interested in 
providing tools which would allow people to 
go beyond the classical distinctions on which 
the social sciences had been based ever since 
the Enlightenment. What I did has at times 
been defined as being part of the so-called 
ontological turn. And if I am part of this it is 
because I feel it’s necessary to go to an analytical 
level which is beyond the classical concepts—
like ‘society’, ‘history’, ‘nature’, ‘transcendence’, 
etc.—that we had been using as matter of fact 
ever since the 19th century. We must go beyond 
them precisely at the level where people detect 
continuities and discontinuities in the world, 
so it’s a very elementary level. And the kind of 
systematization that people will do, according to 
the social setting where they have been brought 
up, as to continuities and discontinuities, seems 
to me to fall within one of these four formulas 
or models. So I’m providing models with 
which to try to understand the rules governing 
compatibilities and incompatibilities between 
features. It’s not intended as a descriptive 
tool; it’s intended as an analytical device to 
understand the conditions of bringing together, 
in what I call collectives, certain features and 
excluding other features. It’s heuristic in that 
sense. And so when I speak of collectives—
borrowing the word from Bruno Latour, 
although with a different sense than the one 
he gave to it—it’s because I’m interested in the 
form of associations that exist all over the world 
with humans and nonhumans. ‘We’ naturalists 
are one of the aggregates. In a sense I disagree 
with Latour on that. ‘We’ decided that there 
were beings which were natural and beings 
which were humans. This was a very important 
dividing line with a lot of consequences, and 
this dividing line resulted in the fact that we 
deal with societies as societies of humans. You 
can speak in ethology at times of ‘social species’, 
for instance, but the great obsession of ethology 
is to avoid projecting sociological concepts onto 
the nonhuman animal species being studied.
So we have excluded nonhumans from 
our collectives. Others have brought them into 
their collectives, but in very different fashions. 
Animists, for instance, see—as I understand 
it—all forms of life, or all morphologically 
distinguished beings who are active, in a way, 
as constituting a tribe, or a tribe-species, as 
I call them, who are in interaction with each 
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other. So there are as many collectives as there 
are morphologically distinct forms of being. I 
always quote this description by Bogoraz of the 
Chukchi, when he said that for the Chukchi the 
shadows on the wall live in their own villages, 
where they subsist by hunting. What does 
this mean? Of course they’re not idiots; they 
understand that the shadows are formed by the 
interposition of bodies with a source of light, 
but this is a specific form of being, which is a 
shadow, and as any other form of being, it has its 
autonomy, it has its social rules, it has its culture, 
etc. So when you’re talking of collectives you’re 
not presupposing that society, as we understand 
it, is the basis, the central concept of analysis, 
that we are giving ourselves—it’s just a form of 
association among others. And what we have to 
study and understand is how people constitute 
these associations, and this is repeatable for 
every other concept. The subject, for instance: 
a subject is not necessarily derived from the 
individual human subject as it is conceived in 
the West. And nor is epistemology, which is 
reflection on what is knowable, something that 
can be understood as it is in the West under the 
conditions of the truth of statements. So every 
philosophical or metaphysical problem that 
has been posed in the West is being posed in a 
different manner elsewhere, and you have to go 
beyond the traditional concepts to understand 
them. This is why it’s ontological. You cannot 
say it’s sociological because being sociological 
would mean that society would explain 
everything, which is not the case. Society is the 
product, the thing to be explained. It’s not the 
explanatory factor.
I’m not the only one engaged in this 
project, but it implies a complete reformulation 
of all the concepts we’re using, and in fact of 
the intellectual framework with which we 
understand human and nonhuman diversity 
in the world, and this reframing has many 
consequences, some of them being political. The 
state of the world, including global warming 
and mass extinction and pollution, is a result, 
among other things, of this idea that there is, 
on the one hand, a natural environment and, on 
the other, a society that views and understands 
and projects its conceptualization of this 
environment. This idea is partly responsible 
for the current situation. It was responsible 
for very good things also—the development of 
sciences, of physics, of chemistry etc. I’m not 
a moralist in that sense. I’ve been discussing 
this with Tim Ingold, for instance, because 
I think he has a more moral position; for him 
Western epistemology, to use a vague word, 
is responsible for a completely immoral and 
false view of the world—if you wish, a false 
apprehension of the world. Whereas I think 
it’s a partial apprehension of the world. Any 
ontology leads to a specific systematization of 
certain properties of the world, so any ontology 
gives a blueprint for composing certain kinds 
of worlds. But there are no worlds that are 
intrinsically better than others. They are all 
partial realizations of potentialities, qualities, 
processes, or relations that, for some of them, 
obviously exist independently from us; and all 
these partial realizations are legitimate. We 
can, and we should, fight the consequences of 
Western hubris and of what naturalism has 
provoked but, as such, it’s not more true or false 
than an animist or analogist point of view. So 
in that respect, if I were to give a definition 
of anthropology, it would be the study of the 
art of composing worlds. And the political 
relevance of it is that we can gain through 
this study an understanding of better ways to 
compose a common world where nonhumans 
as well as other modes of composition could all 
legitimately be represented. 
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AT: Your current research on landscape 
extends your work on the four ontological 
modes. How does the concept of iconic 
figuration relate to these four ontological 
modes? What is its critical value for the 
anthropology of landscape and in what 
direction do you imagine this will take you in 
the future?
PD: I think one has to distinguish what I’m 
doing on landscapes and what I’m doing on 
images. When I propounded the analytic 
framework of the four modes of identification in 
Beyond Nature and Culture I was using discursive 
materials. Even if they mostly belonged to 
so-called oral literature, they were propositional; 
and I said, ‘If there is any relevance in what 
I’m proposing it might be a good idea to see 
how it works with images, to see whether the 
continuities and the discontinuities which I 
surmise that people perceive in the objects 
of their environment are rendered visible in 
icons.’ So initially I became interested—apart 
from a personal interest I had for many years 
in the visual arts and their history as a manner 
of verifying or ascertaining how these modes 
of identification would be expressed in images, 
and then progressively I went much beyond 
that. I’m working on that still. I’m writing a 
book—which is taking much more time than I 
thought—in which the central argument is that 
images are iconic agents. They are both signs 
that stand for something and agents that act 
upon humans (and other beings). There has been 
a curious drift of late between people who treat 
images mainly as having agency—Alfred Gell 
gave prominence to the idea but it started long 
before—and people who treat images as iconic 
signs which render visible a referent. Obviously 
they are both, and so you have to study how they 
can be both at the same time. They have agency 
because they are active in certain circumstances, 
notably ritual circumstances, and they also 
trigger mechanisms of recognition which are 
necessary for their agency to be expressed in the 
right way on the right kind of persons. So what 
I’m doing now is studying both how images are 
good iconic clues of certain ontologies—in the 
sense that they reveal processes and connections 
between existents that are indicative of a 
certain way of composing a world in a specific 
ontology—and, at the same time, how they are 
agents that can play an active part in the life 
of humans in certain circumstances because in 
each of these ontologies they are activated by 
certain formal devices, which are also specific to 
the ontologies. So it’s a madly ambitious project 
because the amount of visual material which it 
requires is absolutely huge.
Landscape is another thing. It’s going to 
be obvious in the lecture I will give later on 
today that I’ve been dissatisfied with the way 
that landscape has been treated in anthropology 
or in the social sciences in general. As a very 
loose term, nevertheless based on a quite 
definite genealogy in the West, landscape has 
been used—and in fact listening to some of 
the papers at the conference confirmed this 
impression—very much like mana was used in 
anthropology some decades ago. That is, it’s a 
European concept with different local origins, 
whether you consider landscape, landschaft, 
landschap, paesaggio, paisaje, paysage, etc. And it 
is being used much like mana was; that is, as 
a blanket concept, never precisely defined, you 
can use to describe almost any form of human 
relation to space, especially those to which you 
have no direct access. And I don’t think it’s a 
good way to do anthropology, to use a concept 
just to subsume under it almost anything, from 
the subjective relation to sites to anthropogenic 
environments. So this is the basis of my interest 
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in landscape, a militant one; it is also based on 
a personal taste for landscape painting, gardens 
and walking ‘in nature’.
AT: What do you consider the most significant 
ways fieldwork has changed since the 1970s 
when you began to do ethnography? In what 
ways has it remained unchanged, and how 
would you advise students starting their 
research careers today?
PD: There’s an anecdote I told once in a lecture 
which was told to me by Meyer Fortes in 
Cambridge years ago. It was what Malinowski 
told him before he went to do fieldwork with 
the Tallensi. Malinowski said, as recounted by 
Fortes, ‘Meyer, you’re going to write me a letter 
after a few weeks saying that it’s horrible: the 
food is horrible, the climate is horrible, the 
people are not nice at all. Then you’ll write me a 
series of letters saying things are getting better, 
you’re getting to work, getting good material 
and then at the end of the year you’re going to 
write me a letter saying, “I think it’s alright now, 
I have all the material, I have a few more things 
to ascertain and then I’ll come back.” And 
then you’ll write me another letter, one month 
after that, saying, “I got it all wrong, I have to 
stay much longer.”’ And this is the standard 
experience of fieldwork, for everyone anywhere, 
and if it’s not the case, if you feel you can wrap 
it up in six months, then I don’t think it’s good 
fieldwork. Fieldwork is a very bizarre experience 
which is often compared to psychoanalysis; 
there is a series of steps wherever the fieldwork 
is being done that one has to follow in order to a 
get a grasp of what is going on, and this doesn’t 
change: this is the miracle of ethnography. 
So what are the changes with respect 
to that? The main changes are that more and 
more people tend to study social settings that 
are closer to their own upbringings. You don’t 
do anthropology to resolve your own identity 
problems, so trying to study a place where you 
were born and where you were raised might 
be good to your soul or your self-esteem, but 
you have to have outstanding self-reflexive 
and critical capacities to do that well. So I 
don’t think it’s a very good tendency. I don’t 
advocate going to ‘primitive tribes’ but I think 
the cultural and social, even linguistic distance 
is important in the sense that it provides the 
initial movement towards being aware of the 
differences. Another dimension which I think 
is interesting but not very easy to develop is 
multi-sited ethnography, because you have 
to stay in each of the sites long enough to 
undergo the kind of progressive understanding 
which Meyer Fortes was mentioning, and 
which I think most anthropologists will have 
the experience of. And finally—pleading for 
my parish in a way—I think that if you are 
interested in the relationship between humans 
and nonhumans, what is called multispecies 
ethnography now, it requires a good capacity 
to study nonhumans. So if you are interested in 
the study of the relationship between humans 
and specific plant communities, it requires 
botany and the physiology of plants, how plants 
communicate, etc.; if you are interested in the 
study of the relationship between humans 
and specific animal communities, it requires 
ethology, animal cognition and communication, 
physiology of reproduction, etc. There are 
people who are doing that more and more. They 
are not so numerous because in fact it requires 
acquiring a double training. I have a young 
colleague who has been doing that for wolves 
and herders. He is both an ethologist studying 
wolves and an ethnologist studying herders, so 
he can understand how the communities have 
evolved together in specific circumstances, and 
how one community of wolves is different 
from another community of wolves that he 
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studies comparatively elsewhere. He started 
his work with herders in Kyrgyzstan. He did 
his PhD, then he’s been studying relationships 
with wolves and large predators in Norway 
and Macedonia. I think this is compulsory 
if you don’t want to stay in the realm of fancy. 
When you talk about human relationships 
with animals you have to study the latter in 
depth at the same time as humans. But it’s 
always a relationship, otherwise you become an 
ethologist. If you really are interested in doing 
multispecies ethnography you have to study 
how humans and nonhumans influence each 
other, and I think it’s a very interesting direction 
of research for avoiding the anthropocentric 
prejudice of the social sciences.
